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AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

The globalization of economic activity, including the expansion of
international trade, the amazing ability of international capital markets to
transfer capital rapidly across borders, and the movement in Europe
toward greater economic unification, have made it more difficult for
nations independently to fashion tax laws that properly balance their
own equity, economic efficiency and simplicity goals. This is what
makes this conference to analyze the international aspects of recent proposals to replace the federal income tax with some form of consumption
tax, with particular emphasis on the Nunn-Domenici "USA" tax and the
Armey-Shelby flat tax ("flat tax"), so important. As the paper by Stephen Shay and Victoria Summers well demonstrates, it would be absurd
to consider major tax restructuring in the United States without assessing the potential effects of such a change on international flows of capital and trade, on our existing treaty network, and on our domestic
international tax law.' We must also anticipate the likely responses of
other nations. The first lesson is that the forms of consumption tax proposals that seem to enjoy the most political support in the United States
today are unique creations both in their structure, and because they
would completely supplant the current income tax system. Indeed, it is
this uniqueness that makes the Shay-Summers paper so important and
the discussion at this conference so necessary.
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that the greatest disparity
between this nation's tax system and those of our trading partners is that
other countries rely more heavily on consumption taxes. On average,
the OECD countries collect about one-third of their tax revenues from
* Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University. This commentary draws from

both my book, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF TE INCoME TAX (W. W. Norton, 1997) and an
article co-authored by Michael O'Hear, The 'Original Intent' of U.S. International Taxation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997).

1. See 51 U. MiAw L. REv. 1029 (1997).

1093

1094

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1093

consumption taxes, and over the past thirty years consumption taxes as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product have more than doubled in these
nations. 2 As nations' tax systems converge-partly in response to
increased capital mobility-the United States seems likely to move
toward increased taxation of consumption, perhaps as these proposals
suggest, as a substitute for all or a large part of the existing income tax.
If the United States were to add a credit-method value added tax
(VAT) or a retail sales tax at the federal level, we would not be forced to
face any real issues regarding the imposition of such a tax on international transactions. We undoubtedly would follow the standard practice
throughout the world of imposing such a tax on a destination basis,
thereby exempting exports and taxing imports.' Under such a tax system, no question of allowing foreign tax credits would arise, nor would
we be concerned that such a change would destabilize either our domestic international income tax law or our income tax treaty network. The
routine treatment of international trade under credit-method value added
taxes has become well entrenched in worldwide practice during the past
three decades. Through both multilateral agreements and standard operating practices, the revenues from these consumption taxes are generally
ceded to the country where the consumption occurs. If we were just
considering adding a credit-method VAT to the current federal tax mix,
this conference would be unnecessary; the tax would be imposed on a
destination basis.
But the proponents of unique consumption tax alternatives-the
flat tax and the USA taxes-have forced us to think anew about the
standard practices for international taxation under both income and consumption taxes. They make us confess that we are less certain about the
reasons for these longstanding practices than we are about what those
practices are. To analyze these proposals properly, we should reexamine
the basic principles that undergird routine international consumption tax
rules.
As the Shay-Summers paper details, the USA tax combines a flat
rate subtraction method VAT at the business level with a progressive
rate personal expenditure tax at the individual level. Employers can take
a credit against the former for their share of payroll taxes. The flat tax
proposal essentially divides the collection of a flat rate subtraction2. Ken Messere, Taxation in Ten IndustrializedCountries in the Last Decade: An Overview,

11 TAX NoTEs INr'L, Aug. 21, 1995, at 512.
3. The former Soviet Republic seems to be the most important exception, applying VATs on
an origin basis for trade between the republics. See Charles E. McLure, InternationalImplications

of the Flat Tax, 50 BuLL. FOR INT'L FIscAL DocUMENTATION 511 (1996). Apparently the
European community is considering shifting from destination-based VATs to an origin basis with

compensation to be paid from revenue-winning countries to revenue losers.
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method VAT between businesses and individuals. Rather than denying
businesses a deduction for wages-the usual rule under a subtraction
method value added tax-the flat tax allows businesses to deduct both
wages and purchases from other businesses and collects the tax on the
value added from wages at the individual level. Each individual or family would be allowed an exemption for a specified amount of wages. As
Shay and Summers demonstrate, the total of the flat tax business and
individual tax bases equals total retail sales, putting aside any exemptions. As Alan Auerbach, among others, has observed, the flat tax is
"basically a value added tax combined with credit for low income
households. It may differ from traditional value added taxes in the
method of collection, but this is not significant."4 In contrast to the flat
tax, a credit-method VAT or a retail sales tax is typically collected
entirely from businesses without requiring any individual reporting or
remittance of taxes to the government.
Senators Nunn and Domenici have proposed a progressive rate
individual level consumption tax in an effort to avoid the substantial tax
reductions that would occur for high-income families if a flat rate consumption tax were substituted for the income tax. The principal advantage of the flat tax's division of a value added tax between business and
individuals is that it exempts a certain amount of wages from tax,
thereby eliminating the regressivity of standard flat rate consumption
taxes for low and moderate wage earners. In contrast to Senators Nunn
and Domenici, the flat tax proponents are apparently not concerned with
the substantial tax reduction for the wealthy that would occur if income
(and estate) taxes were completely replaced with a flat rate consumption
tax. It would be possible under such a flat tax to impose progressive tax
rates on wages. Some economists have suggested this but have failed to
show why, in a consumption tax world, wages, but not investment
income, should be subject to progressive tax rates. The key point for our
purposes here is that both the flat tax and USA tax variations on the
standard form of consumption taxes have been advanced to address their
proponents' concerns about the distributional effects of standard consumption taxes, and to conform consumption taxes to their visions of
taxation in accordance with ability to pay.
The concern over the distributional impact of these taxes-a classic
domestic tax policy concern-may have important international tax consequences. As the Shay-Summers paper makes clear, neither the flat tax
4. Flat Taxes: Some Economic Considerations, 1995: Hearings on S.488 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 104th CONG. (1995) (statement of Alan J. Auerbach, Professor of
Tax Policy & Finance), available in 1995 WL 151912; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Interntional
Implications of the Flat Tax, 50 BuLL. FOR INT'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 511 (1996); see also
McLure, supra note 3,at 511.
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nor the USA tax is easily conformed to the prevalent world practice of
taxing only consumption within a nation's borders. Indeed, the flat tax
exempts imports and taxes exports, the opposite result from the value
added taxes presently in place in more than one hundred other countries.
The business-level USA tax is designed, like other nations' VATs, to be
imposed on a destination basis, but, as the Shay-Summers paper points
out, this would likely be challenged under GATT. The tax credit for the
employers' share of payroll taxes which is allowed against the business
level USA tax would have the effect of converting payroll taxes from an
origin to a destination basis and would also raise GATT issues. The
individual level USA tax would deviate from the common worldwide
consumption tax practice by taxing consumption by U.S. citizens and
residents anywhere in the world. Moreover, the USA tax recognizes that
there is no practical way to collect the personal level USA tax on consumption in the United States by residents of foreign countries, something that a credit-method VAT or retail sales tax routinely
accomplishes. Finally, in a sharp departure from common consumption
tax practices, the individual level USA tax allows a foreign tax credit for
foreign income taxes.
Analyzing these tax proposals is made more difficult by the fact
that neither the political proponents of a flat tax nor the initiators of the
USA tax have labeled their proposals consumption taxes. They have
insisted on using income tax labels, and refer to their proposals as consumed income taxes, savings-exempt income taxes, USA taxes or simply flat taxes, and have constructed their proposals to look more like
income taxes than sales or value added taxes. Although most economists and legal analysts have recognized these taxes to be consumption
taxes, politicians apparently prefer the income tax label. Professors Hall
and Robushka of Stanford University, the inventors of the ArmeyShelby flat tax, have been clear about their desire to tax consumption
and have admitted that there are many "economically equivalent ways to
impose consumption taxes."5 Despite their economic similarities, however, the different consumption tax methods are apparently not politically equivalent. For example, it is politically important not to let
elderly consumers know that they are paying a new tax on their
purchases of goods and services, something these proposals accomplish
both by avoiding any separate statement to consumers of the taxes
included in the prices of the goods and services they purchase and by
looking like an income tax. Politicians' claims that they are imposing an
income tax, when their proposals are in substance consumption taxes,
5. Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, Of Revenue and Revolution; Simplify, Simplify, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 8, 1995, at A19.
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make efforts to evaluate both the6 domestic and international tax aspects
of their proposals more difficult.
I1.THE GATT
As the Shay-Summers paper points out, the structure and political
spin of these proposals may have genuine economic consequences in the
international arena. I accept the Shay-Summers conclusions that the flat
tax and the individual level USA tax would be classified as a "direct"
tax under the GATT and that the "direct-indirect" issue would be controversial under the USA business tax. Congressman Armey and Senator
Shelby have apparently made it impossible under current GATT rules to
impose a consumption tax on a destination rather than an origin basis
simply by transferring collection of the wage portion of a value added
tax from the business to the individual level. This change alone apparently converts an "indirect" tax, which can be imposed on imports but
not exports, into a "direct" tax that must be imposed on exports but
cannot be imposed on imports. How can this kind of difference be
determinative given our modem understanding of the substantive equivalence of collecting the same tax at different levels?
The GAIT rules for permitting border adjustments for "indirect"
taxes while forbidding them for "direct" taxes can be viewed as GATT's
answer to the question of tax incidence. On this view, a retail sales tax
or VAT is assumed to be borne by the consumer, and therefore, if the tax
is imposed on a destination basis, tax revenues are sent to the national
government whose residents (purchasers) actually paid the tax. Likewise, assuming the corporate income tax reduces corporate profits
implies that rebating such a tax would simply serve to transfer money
from the nation of consumption to the nation of production. There is,
however, no certainty that the GATT answer is correct. 7 As the
Princeton economist, Harvey Rosen, reasons: "If, in fact, the corporation tax is included in the price of goods produced in the corporate sector, then in some sense, American producers do not receive the rebate to
which they are 'entitled'. '' 8 Indeed, when the ability to border adjust a
broad-based flat rate consumption tax turns on how the tax is collected,
there is every reason to regard the GATT "direct-indirect" distinction as
archaic and formalistic, and completely divorced from economic
substance.
Nevertheless, one need not believe that the "direct-indirect" distinc6.
income
7.
8.

Parenthetically, the income tax shape of these taxes may also make it easier to return to
taxation simply by eliminating the immediate deduction of capital expenditures.
See, e.g., HAvEy S.RosEN, PUBLIc FNANcE 549 (2d ed. 1988).

Id.
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tion of the GATT is any more sensible (or transparent) than the same
distinction under the U.S. Constitution to recognize the potential real
world consequences of an adverse GATT determination. Even though
this kind of tax issue does not fit into the "national security" exception,
the United States might nevertheless refuse to abide by an adverse
World Trade Organization interpretation of GATT. 9 But it seems
unlikely that the United States would undermine the authority of the
WTO over this issue; after all, GATT objections led to the demise of the
Domestic International Sales Corporation and have long blocked the
United States from imposing an oil import tax. If we are-bound by
GATT constraints, the income tax garb of these proposals and the way
they are collected may affect not only the U.S. public's perception of
these taxes, but also may ultimately determine their international tax
consequences, including which nation gets the revenue, perhaps in a
manner contrary to that envisioned by their originators and supporters.
I1I.

ADDITIONAL RESPONSES OF OTHER NATIONS

Shay and Summers, along with some other commentators such as
Reuven Avi-Yonah, also seem correct when they suggest that foreign
nations could be concerned that the United States would become a major
new tax haven for capital income, if such proposals were enacted,
responding in this case to the consumption tax economics of these proposals rather than their income or "direct" tax structure. A further word
of explanation seems appropriate. Some analysts have suggested that
rather than regarding the consumption tax as exempting all capital, as is
suggested by the Shay-Summers paper, we should view a consumption
tax as exempting only the "normal" or "riskless" rate of return on capital.' 0 Even under this view of a consumption tax, however, the United
States would always be more attractive than a country with an income
tax for investments that yield a normal or above-normal rate of return.
The relative advantage of U.S. investments would depend on the tax
rates in the two countries and the portion of the return that is abovenormal."l For example, if the above-normal return were half the total
return, the United States would be more favorable to investment unless
its tax rates were double that of the foreign nation.
A foreign tax credit system could protect foreign nations against
runaway capital attempting to take advantage of the new U.S. tax
9. Cf. David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejects Role for World Court in Trade Dispute, N.Y. TnMEs,
Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
10. E.g., McLure, supra note 3; Alvin C. Warren, How Much CapitalIncome Taxed Under an
Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash-flow Tax? (forthcoming).
11. McLure, supra note 3, at 513.
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regime. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect territorial foreign
nations to move toward a foreign tax credit system if the United States
were to replace its income tax with a consumption tax. 2 In fact, simply
moving to a foreign tax credit may not be regarded as an adequate
response if other nations come to view the United States as a tax haven
for capital investments. Even under a foreign tax credit system, the current practice of deferring tax on earnings of foreign subsidiaries offers
advantages for investments in low tax countries until the earnings are
repatriated. Foreign nations might reconsider this practice if the United
States were to replace the income tax with the flat tax, the USA tax, or
any other consumption tax. Alternatively, nations that now exempt foreign source income earned in an active foreign business may treat the
United States as a tax haven and refuse to allow such exemption for
investments in the United States. 3 The U.S. repeal of the income tax
might then have the effect of changing the focus of exemption systems
from looking at types of income1 4 (e.g., Subpart F) to asking whether the
foreign country is a tax haven.
Enacting either the USA tax or the flat tax proposal would represent the kind of shift in tax regimes that seems likely to prompt the kinds
of responses that Shay-Summers and other commentators have predicted
would undermine the existing tax treaty equilibrium. Given the pace of
such negotiations, a renegotiation process could take many years, and
the uncertainties during the interval could prove daunting to taxpayers
and governments alike.
IV.

PRINCIPLE OR PRACTICE?

The most vexing issue regarding the international aspects of the flat
tax and USA tax proposals is their departure from the standard destination-basis consumption tax regime. As the Shay-Summers paper and the
above comments demonstrate, the unique method of collection and
income tax appearance of the consumption tax proposals considered
here raise fundamental questions about the underlying principles of
well-settled international taxation practices. They demonstrate that
changing the form of a consumption tax and the way it is collected,
12. See generally, Harry Grubert and Scott T. Newlon, The International Implications of
Consumption Tax Proposals,48 NAT'L TAX. J. 619 (1995); Reuven Avi-Yonah, From Income to
Consumption Tax: Some InternationalImplications 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1329 (1996).
13. New Zealand apparently has compiled a "white list" of countries where investments
qualify for foreign tax credits or exemption.
14. One can generally design exemption and tax credit systems to have quite similar effects.
See HUGH AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INcoME TAXATION: A STRucTURAL ANALYSis 380-85,
402-25 (1997) (discussing use of a foreign source income exemption in the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and France).
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without necessarily changing its essential nature or its substance, may
unsettle previously accepted international tax practices. By advancing
the USA tax and flat tax proposals, proponents have raised the issue
whether the routine rules for imposing international taxes on consumption and for allocating revenues from such taxes to the country where the
consumption occurs are grounded on firm principles or merely reflect
historical practice and longstanding political compromises.
A preliminary analysis of this question suggests that the standard
destination basis of a consumption tax can be more easily attributed to
historical development than to any current fundamental economic
advantages it may have over origin-based consumption taxes, or any reasoned consideration of the appropriate allocation of consumption tax
revenues among nations. The Shay-Summers approach began its commentary with an analysis of the retail sales tax. Imposing a retail sales
tax without making any international adjustments would allocate the tax
on a destination basis. The tax would be collected at the time and place
of the retail sale; such transactions normally occur in the jurisdiction
where consumption itself will take place. If the tax is on the consumer,
the revenue would be collected by the country where the consumption
occurs. If the tax base covered all forms of consumption, a destinationbased retail sales tax would not affect either choices about what to consume or where to locate production, although it could affect both laborleisure and savings-consumption tradeoffs. Obviously, imposing a retail
sales tax alone would not benefit international trade, but there could be
advantages to such a tax if it replaces a tax that harms international
trade.
The chief distinction between a credit-method value added tax and
a retail sales tax is the time and place of collection. If the collection of
such a consumption tax is moved up to earlier stages of production and
sale, border adjustments in the form of exemptions for exports and taxes
on imports would be necessary to reach results equivalent to those under
a retail sales tax. Such border adjustments would allocate the revenues
from the tax to the jurisdiction where the retail sale takes place. As with
a retail sales tax, the nation where the consumption occurs will collect
the revenues from the tax, and international trade would not be affected.
It should not be assumed, however, that the nation of final sale has
a better claim to consumption tax revenues than the country where the
product was produced and where much of the value has been added. If a
Cadillac is produced in the United States, but is purchased and used in
Denmark, it is not clear that Denmark, the nation of consumption, has a
better claim to the tax revenues than the United States, the nation of
production, even if we assume that the tax is borne by Danish consum-
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ers. The country where production occurs has, through government
expenditures, provided the tangible infrastructure and legal institutions
that facilitated production. Collecting a value-added tax in exchange for
these benefits seems quite reasonable.
Economic analysis does not offer a clear justification for preferring
destination-based over origin-based consumption taxes. Even though it
would appear that an origin-based consumption tax might affect the
location of production, economists have generally agreed with ShaySummers that a destination-based consumption tax does not offer any
economic advantages over an origin-based consumption tax after taking
into account adjustments in exchange rates, prices, and wages.15 There
15. See Flat Taxes: Some Economic Considerations, 1995: Hearings on S. 488 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 104th CONG. (1995) (statement of Alan J. Auerbach, Professor of
Tax Policy & Public Finance) available in 1995 WL 151912; Professor Alvin Warren has
illustrated this argument with the following example:
Suppose that the U.S. has an origin-based VAT of 10 percent with no border
adjustments, and that a U.S. consumer product which costs $100 to produce will sell
for $110, including the tax, whether sold in the U.S. or for export. Assume that a
comparable product is produced in country Z and sells for 11OZ in the local zed
currency. Assume further that the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Z
zed is 1$ = IZ. Finally, for simplicity, assume that there are no transportation costs
for shipping the products.
Under these conditions, consumers in the U.S. and Z will choose between the
two products on the assumption that they will sell for identical prices. Consumers
in Z have the choice of buying the Z product for I1OZ or buying the U.S. product
for $110, which will require 110Z. Similarly, U.S. consumers can buy either
product for $110. A U.S. producer has the choice of selling in the U.S. market for
$110 or exporting for 11OZ, which will yield $110. In either case, the U.S. producer
would retain $100 after payment of U.S. taxes.
What will happen if the U.S. replaces its origin-based VAT with a destinationbased VAT that exempts exports and taxes imports? Initially, the Z product appears
more expensive to U.S. consumers than the U.S. product, because the Z product will
sell for $121 (the old price of $110 plus the new 10 percent tax), whereas the U.S.
product will still sell for $110. Similarly, the U.S. product now looks less expensive
than the Z product to Z consumers, because the tax rebate means that the U.S.
product can now be exported from the U.S. for $100. The U.S. producer might
therefore think it has an advantage in Z, where the comparable local product
continues to sell for 110Z. Hence it is often argued that a destination-based VAT
would stimulate exports, and that an origin-based VAT would not.
Now consider what happens when the U.S. and Z consumers start to switch
from Z products to U.S. products, because the latter appear to be less expensive.
That switch would mean that there would be less demand for the Z currency by U.S.
nationals (who are reducing their imports of the Z product) and more demand for the
U.S. currency by Z nationals (who are increasing their imports of the U.S. product).
Given this change in demand, the value of the dollar will rise relative to the zed
until there is no longer any advantage to switching from Z products to U.S.
products, given the consumers' preferences relating to matters other than price,
which preferences are independent of the tax law. In this simple example, the value
of the dollar would rise until $1 could be exchanged for .IZ.
U.S. consumers would then have the choice between buying the U.S. product
for $110 (including the tax) or the Z product for $100 (which would exchange for
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are, however, important differences in terms of the revenues that would
be raised by a particular country under the two types of taxes. For
example, as Alan Auerbach points out, a country which is a net debtor,
such as the United States, will receive more revenue under an originbased consumption tax, and a country which is a net creditor would
receive more revenues with a destination-based tax. 16 The financial
interests of nations concerning the choices between destination-based
and origin-based consumption taxes may diverge. Unlike the case of
income taxes, where longstanding political compromises have split tax
revenues between source and residence countries, in the consumption
tax context, international coordination has generally been achieved by
imposing consumption taxes on a destination basis, a practice which has
been reinforced by GATI'.
The regime of destination-based VATs and other consumption
taxes came into place, however, during an era when exchange rates were
fixed and did not adjust in response to changes in economic circumstances or fiscal policy. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, imposing a
VAT on an origin basis would have disadvantaged nations in terms of
business decisions regarding where to locate production facilities. In
order to protect its own interests, each nation imposed a value added tax
on a destination basis and agreed to destination-based consumption taxes
on a multilateral basis. This practice reflected a uniform desire to avoid
disadvantaging domestic producers through origin-based taxes.
Of course, if the nation of origin imposes a VAT in that country
and the destination nation also imposes a tax on the full retail price,
consumption will be taxed twice. Likewise, exports from a destinationbased consumption tax country to an origin-based importing nation may
not be subject to consumption taxation at all. In contrast to income taxation, however, where such over- or under-taxation affects the allocation
of capital, it is not clear that this double or zero consumption taxation of
international transactions will have any real economic consequences,
11OZ), plus the 10 percent tax on imports, for a total of $110. Z consumers would
have the choice between buying the Z product for I OZ or the U.S. product for
$100, which would require 110Z. A U.S. producer could sell the U.S. product at
home for $110 (including $10 in VAT) or abroad for 110Z, which would yield
$100, on which no U.S. tax would be due. In either case, the U.S. producer would
retain $100 after payment of U.S. taxes.
Taking into account the change in exchange rates brought about by the change
in relative prices of the U.S. and Z products due to the introduction of border
adjustments, the destination-based VAT has no advantage over the origin-based
VAT in terms of stimulating exports in this example. One of the U.S. products
under discussion exchanges for one of the Z products in both the U.S. and country Z
under both taxes. The U.S. producer earns the same amount from a sale at home
and a sale abroad under either tax.
16. See Alan J. Auerbach, supra note 15.
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after currency adjustments. Nevertheless, such a regime will raise substantial political objections.
Indeed, imposing a flat tax on an origin, rather than destination
basis, threatens the political viability of the tax itself. For example, if
exports, but not imports, were taxed, the full retail sales value of an
automobile that was manufactured in the United States and that will be
used in the United States, will be included in the flat tax base. Likewise,
if a U.S. automobile manufacturer sells automobiles manufactured in the
United States to a foreign dealer for use abroad, the manufacturer's sales
price would be subject to the U.S. flat tax. But, a U.S. dealer of cars
manufactured in a foreign country, such as Japan or Germany, would be
taxed in the United States only on the excess of the dealer's sales
receipts over the cost of the cars from the foreign manufacturer. In other
words, the costs of manufacturing cars abroad for use in the United
States would not be included in the U.S. flat tax base; only the dealer's
mark-up would be subject to U.S. taxation. In foreign countries, the full
value of imports from the United States would be subject to value added
taxes while cars exported to the United States would be exempt. In sum,
the value of U.S. cars would be subject to two consumption taxes, while
foreign cars exported to the United States would largely be exempt from
consumption taxation. As previously stated, economists, including the
inventors of the flat tax, claim that there would be no adverse economic
consequences to U.S. producers from this circumstance because currency exchange rates will compensate for these tax differences. But
U.S. automobile manufacturers and other U.S. companies that compete
with products from abroad will not readily accept economists' assurances that exchange rates will adjust quickly and effectively.
Domestic businesses undoubtedly will resist rules that would
impose a U.S. tax on the full retail price of products manufactured in the
United States, but would tax only the dealer markup of products manufactured abroad. They will view such a tax as fundamentally unfair to
U.S. businesses and perhaps as entailing a serious competitive disadvantage to U.S. manufacturers. This could be an important, perhaps even a
decisive, issue. U.S. businesses vehemently-and effectively-opposed
President Clinton's 1993 proposed energy tax because of the potential
disadvantages to domestic versus foreign products. Such opposition
could prove the death knell of the flat tax.
The willingness of flat tax proponents to advocate an origin-based
consumption tax is also inconsistent with the political judgment of Senators Nunn and Domenici, who regard the imposition of the businesslevel USA tax on a destination basis as an important political advantage,
and who also have attempted to convert the employers' payroll tax from
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an origin to a destination basis by allowing businesses to credit the
employers' payroll tax against their subtraction-method VAT.
With regard to the individual-level USA tax, Senators Nunn and
Domenici recognize that imposing progressive tax rates on an individual's total consumption, implies a tax on an individual's consumption
wherever it occurs. Only the residence country will have the capacity to
know the total worldwide consumption of its residents and citizens. The
source country will have incomplete information since it can know only
the amount of consumption by nonresidents within its borders. This is
why the USA tax would tax consumption by U.S. citizens or residents
on a worldwide basis. In proposing this, Senators Nunn and Domenici
have added residence to the usual consumption tax options of origin and
destination. Under this scheme, a product manufactured in China and
consumed in Europe by a U.S. citizen or resident will be taxed by the
United States under the individual-level USA tax. In this instance, if no
credit is allowed for the foreign consumption taxes, U.S. residents consuming abroad rather than at home will be economically disadvantaged
and no offsetting adjustment in currency values seems likely to compensate for the disadvantages.
The ability-to-pay emphasis of the individual-level USA tax, which
argues for taxation of worldwide consumption by the residence country,
would not be contradicted by allowing a foreign tax credit for consumption taxes actually imposed by other nations, or by exempting foreign
consumption that is taxed by the destination country in a manner similar
to how it would be taxed in the nation of residence (an exemption with
progression). The Nunn-Domenici foreign tax credit is mysterious,
however. If Senators Nunn and Domenici are concerned that consumption abroad will be taxed twice-which could be caused by other countries' imposition of a destination basis VAT, for example-a credit
against the USA tax for foreign consumption taxes would be appropriate. But why allow a foreign tax credit for foreign income taxes against
a U.S. consumption tax? The credit would undermine the longstanding
U.S. position that allows only foreign income taxes to be credited
against U.S. income taxes. Are we on the threshold of cross-crediting
17
income and consumption taxes depending on their form?
Finally, there are distinct tax enforcement issues that arise when
dealing with the taxation of international income or consumption. An
easy way to stumble into zero taxation is to allocate a tax claim to a
country that cannot collect it. For example, it is critical under the individual-level USA tax to avoid a regime where deductions are allowed
17. Charles E.McLure &George R. Zodrow, The Economic Casefor Foreign Tax Creditsfor
Cash Flow Taxes (1995) (unpublished paper).
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for investments in one nation, but where disinvestments and consumption may occur in another nation free of tax.' 8 Enforcement advantages
have sometimes been offered as a justification for taxing income at
source, but these advantages seem to offer little guidance in choosing
between origin- and destination-based value added taxes.' 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The USA and flat tax proposals make clear that the international
tax consequences of both income and consumption taxes tend to turn on
whether the tax is collected from businesses or from individuals. In the
income tax arena, longstanding practices have produced a division of
revenues between countries of source and countries of residence,
depending on whether income tax is collected from businesses or individuals. Along with many other countries, the United States allows foreign tax credits for income taxes of other countries; those nations who
do not allow foreign tax credits typically exempt foreign source income.
We regularly negotiate income tax treaties based on a U.S. model tax
treaty, while other nations negotiate their income tax treaties based on
the closely related OECD model tax treaty. These rules are routinely
described as generally allocating revenues from business income taxes
to the country of source and taxes on passive income to the country of
residence. This allocation has been referred to as the 1920s compromise, since its basic outline has been around since the 1921 Tax Act and
the model international tax treaties promulgated by the League of
Nations nearly seventy years ago. 20
Even if the flat tax and USA tax proposals are ultimately relegated
to the legislative waste bin, this longstanding income tax compromise is
becoming unraveled as a result of the integration of corporate and individual income taxes throughout most of the industrialized world.21
Analysis of corporate tax integration has shown three integration methods that are fundamentally equivalent: 1) allowing a corporate income
tax deduction for corporate dividends, 2) allowing individual shareholders to exclude dividends from income, and 3) converting all or part of
the corporate income tax into a withholding tax on dividends and
allowing shareholders a credit for the corporate taxes that have been
18. Klaus Vogel, Reflections on the Future of the OECD Model Convention and
Commentary, 50 BuLL. FOR INT'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 527, 528 (1996).

19. Michael J. Graetz & Michael O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DuKE LJ. 1021 (1997) [hereinafter Original Intent].
20. Id.
21. See, e.g.,

REPORT OF THE CoMMIrEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON CoMPANY TAXATION,

(Ruding Report) (Brussels, 1992).

1106

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1093

paid with respect to the dividends they receive. 22 Despite their economic equivalence, however, these proposals differ significantly in
whether the tax collected is a business level or individual level tax. As
suggested, longstanding international income tax practice would presumptively allocate these revenues differently among source and residence countries depending upon whether the relief from double taxation
of corporate source income occurs at the individual or business level.
International taxation of both consumption and income taxes
should not turn so crucially on the form of these taxes. There may be
very good domestic tax policy reasons for preferring that a tax be collected from businesses or from individuals. As the foregoing discussion
suggests, individualizing a consumption tax, as both the USA tax and
flat tax do, makes achieving their proponents' policy goals concerning
the distribution of these taxes easier. On the other hand, collecting a tax
from businesses eases the costs of tax compliance by individuals; the
Treasury Department offered this as a principal reason why it preferred a
dividend exclusion or comprehensive business income tax to a shareholder tax credit. 23 But by demonstrating the importance of form over
substance, both of the consumption tax proposals, which are the subject
of this conference, and the various proposals for integration of the corporate and individual income taxes, call into question the basis for longstanding international income and consumption tax practices.
Unfortunately, so far at least, the principles that form the foundations for
both international income and consumption tax practices do not offer
modern policymakers clear guidance.'
In sum, looking to the standard tax policy analyses of international
tax issues does not offer a clear principled preference for destinationbased taxes over origin-based consumption taxes. Indeed, the USA tax
has advanced a third possible claimant to consumption tax revenues: the
nation of residence. In principle, the countries of origin, destination and
residence all have reasonable bases to claim the revenues from consumption taxation. I am reminded of the prescient observation of
Thomas Sewall Adams, the individual most responsible for the current
shape of the U.S. international tax regime: "Prove to Jurisdiction A that
a given tax, X, logically belongs to Jurisdiction B, and-if self-interest
22. See TAXING BusINEss INCOME ONCE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEms (1992). See also Original
Intent, supra note 19. Integration at the individual or business level may produce some
differences relating to the imposition of progressive rates and this may affect some analysts'

judgment about the appropriate allocation between residence and source countries.
23. See TAXING BUsiNEss INCOME ONCE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CoRPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (1992).
24. See, e.g., Original Intent, supra note 19.
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so dictates-A, in the long run, will develop some subtle modification
of tax X which the accepted theory of jurisdiction assigns to A."25
As a practical matter, it is impossible for a residence country to
protect its residents and citizens against double taxation of international
income without conceding a primary claim of taxation to the country of
source. This was the original justification for the U.S. foreign tax
credit.2 6 Going beyond that requires international negotiations and coordination, bilateral or multinational agreement on principles for the division of tax revenues. In the income tax area, this has occurred through a
bilateral tax treaty process in light of the OECD model. In the consumption tax context, international coordination has occurred by multilateral
agreement (GATT) to impose a standard form consumption tax on a
destination basis.
Given these well settled international practices, one has to ask
whether a belief in American exceptionalism requires the United States
to adopt a form of consumption tax untried elsewhere in the world
instead of moving toward a standard form of value added tax or retail
sales tax. The practical and political international advantages of the
standard form should by now be obvious. A contrary answer to the foregoing question seems appropriate to me only if personalizing the consumption tax, as both the flat tax and the USA tax do, fully satisfies the
American people's concerns about the distributional fairness of replacing the income tax system with a retail sales or value added tax.2 7

25. Ld., quoting from Thomas Sewall Adams, Interstate and InternationalDouble Taxation
125, in LEcrurs ON TAXATION (R. McGill ed., 1932).

OF

26. Id.
27. For an elaboration of this argument, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE
THE INCOME TAX, chapters 13, 14 and 15 (1997).

DECUNE (AND FALL?)

